ID DOC: 186124
FECHA: 2009-07-01 00:00:00
FUENTE: Embassy Panama
PRIVACIDAD: SECRET
REFERENCIA: R 072233Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2821 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE DEA WASHDC COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC DIRJIATF SOUTH CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL CIA WASHDC DIA WASHDC JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC NSC WASHDC SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T PANAMA 000016
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SNAR, PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: NEW AERO-MARITIME SERVICE DIRECTOR MAKES
THE RIGHT NOISES
REF: 08 PANAMA 00725
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
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Summary
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1. (S//NF) "Something is going on," Rigoberto Gordon,
Director of the National Aero-Naval Service (SENAN), told
EMBOFFs December 5, referring to apparent corruption among
former National Maritime Service (SMN) members now in SENAN's
ranks. (Note: SENAN, formed on December 22, combines the
perviously independent SMN and the National Air Service (SAN)
into one civilian service to fill a coast guard-like role.
End Note) He said the situation was worse than he expected,
and that he would remove officers he suspected of wrong-doing
from sensitive jobs. He said the SENAN had serious
operational limitations, including a shortage of technicians
and an operational staff of no more than 400. Gordon
described several key initiatives he was undertaking,
including combining the operations centers from the legacy
air and naval services and collocating them with the
intelligence center. He was also bringing back together the
U.S. trained maintenance crews for the Operation Enduring
Friendship Nortech boats. He expressed interest in having
civilian/civilian U.S. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (read: U.S.
Coast Guard and/or Customs and Border Protection aircraft)
fly out of Panama for longer periods of time, to prevent drug
traffickers from being able to work around the deployments.
End Summary.
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Something is Rotten in the SMN
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2. (S//NF) Rigoberto Gordon, named Director of the National
Aero-Naval Service (SENAN) on December 22, told EMBOFFs
December 5 that he was aware that some of the officers in
the old National Maritime Service (SMN) were "dirty" and said
he was "wary" of them. (Note: The SENAN was created by fusing
together the SMN and the National Air Service (SAN) as part
of a recent security reform (see reftel) Gordon was the
Director of the SAN prior to being named Director of the
SENAN. End Note) Gordon said he had caught one of his senior
SMN officers lying to him about where one of his boats had
been on his first day on the job. The boat had disappeared
for 18 hours, and the crew did not have a coherent
explanation as to what they had been doing. Gordon said he
had a drug prosecutor on hand when the boat returned, and had
an ion-scanned conducted to check for traces of drugs - with
negative results. Asked what he would do about the officers
he did not trust, Gordon said he could not remove these
people from the payroll because they did not have a record of
disciplinary infractions, but that he would try to remove
them from sensitive jobs, and perhaps even transfer them out
of the SENAN. Gordon asserted that the problems he was
finding indicated the SMN had been in much worse shape than
he had expected. He said that, "Something is going on" in the
ranks of former SMN officers, and that he would talk directly
to President Torrijos about what he had found, and what the
next steps should be.
3. (S//NF) Gordon said many boats were out of service for
small defects that could be easily and cheaply repaired. He
said he could not discount the possibility that the boats
were being left un-repaired on purpose to subvert the
SMN/SENAN's response capability. He noted, however, that the
SENAN had very few technicians for its boats: five for the
small go-fast boats, 40 for the larger boats, and all
together only 12-13 who were truly qualified. He said the
SENAN desperately needed to improve its ability to maintain
its fleet. Gordon also asserted that the SMN had brought too
many administrative staff into the merger, and was not a very
"operational" organization. Gordon said that SENAN had a
staff of 1,500, but that many were administrative staff and
political place-holders, leaving him with an operational
staff of approximately 400.
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A Problem Solver
----------------
4. (S//NF) Gordon said that he had already given orders for
the SAN and SMN operations centers to be combined in the new
SENAN headquarters in the former SMN headquarters located at
Cocoli Base, the former U.S. MARFORSOUTH HQ, and adjacent to
former USN Station Rodman. He said he has also ordered that
the intelligence section to be co-located with the new
unified operations center. He said he was now working to have
the teams that were trained in the U.S. to maintain the
Nortech boats of Operation Enduring Friendship brought back
together and put in charge of maintaining the Nortechs again.
(Note: These teams had been dispersed throughout the SMN,
leading to a deterioration of the Nortech boats. End Note)
Discussing the perennial SMN complaint that they do not have
communications capabilities, Gordon said he was in favor of
solving this by acquiring and distributing satellite phones.
Gordon expressed interest in any training opportunities that
might arise for his men, noting that improving the
professional capabilities of the SENAN is key to rebuilding
the service.
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Expanded MPA?
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5. (S//NF) Gordon asked that the deployment of U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Maritime
Patrol Aircraft (MPA) be expanded to cover longer periods of
time. Gordon asserted that drug traffickers were able to plan
their actions around the typical ten-day deployment cycles,
and thus avoid detection. He said he would prefer to see the
planes deployed to Panama for periods of 30 days at a time.
On SENAN capabilities, Gordon said that all three of their
Aviocars were working, and that one was being upgraded for
night operations capability.
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The A Team
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6. (S//NF) Asked who he would depend on to run the SENAN,
Gordon named Major Jeremias Urieta, CDR Osvaldo Uena, CDR
Jose de Jesus Rodriguez, and Commissioner Juan Vergara.
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Comment
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7. (S//NF) Gordon's selection as the SENAN director is
excellent news. As the former pilot for Panamanian President
Torrijos, he has direct access to the President, and a
reputation as a straight shooter. The day after he was named
director of the SAN, he went public with how bad things were
in the organization. His warnings were born out with the
tragic crash of the SAN-100, though Gordon was almost forced
to take political responsibility for that. He has now been
given responsibility for an organization that three of the
presidential candidates have sworn to disband if they win.
The SENAN owes its existence to the highly controversial
security reforms (see reftel) and that means the opposition's
default position is that the merger of the SAN and the SMN
should be reversed. As the Torrijos Administration draws to a
close, and the May 3 general elections and July 1
inauguration near, Gordon has six months to prove that the
creation of the SENAN was a good idea, regardless of how it
came about, and that the new organization is worth saving.
Post believes Gordon deserves full support as he tries to do
this. While the SMN was a corrupt and operationally limited
organization, the upside if Gordon can turn the SENAN around
is tremendous. Panama's territorial waters on the Pacific and
Caribbean sides are two of the most active drug trafficking
routes in the region. USCG and CBP assets cannot cover them
adequately, and U.S. Navy assets are not a viable option,
given strong GOP objections on sovereignty grounds to
deployment of any "military" assets on its territory or in
its territorial waters to conduct operations. Gordon's moves
to co-locate operations and intelligence has long been
advocated by Post, and his personnel moves seem excellent.
Post has an outstanding counter-narcotics relationship with
Panama, and the SMN has always been the exception to the
rule. If Gordon could put willing and competent officers and
men in the right places, then USG cooperation could create a
real deterrent force in Panama's territorial waters for the
first time in years. Post will broach this subject with RADMs
Brice-O'Hara, Nimmich and Lloyd during their visit to Panama
on January 15. Among the ideas being considered to assist the
SENAN are bringing a USCG cutter into Panamanian territorial
waters to conduct counter-narcotics operations with the
SENAN. Post would also like to know whether Gordon's
suggestion that U.S. civilian MPA assets be deployed for
longer periods of time in Panama is logistically and
operationally feasible and/or desirable.
STEPHENSON
