Deportes

Planes para establecer cuatro centros de operación marítima


ID DOC: 233963
FECHA: 2009-09-11 00:00:00
FUENTE: Embassy Panama
PRIVACIDAD: CONFIDENTIAL
REFERENCIA: VZCZCXYZ0002 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHZP #0829/01 3132328 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 092328Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0071 INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTO


C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000829



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2024

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MASS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, PM

SUBJECT: PLANS TO ESTABLISH FOUR MARITIME OPERATIONS CENTERS



CLASSIFIED BY: Debra L. Hevia, Political Counselor, State, POL;

REASON: 1.4(B), (D)



1. (C) Summary: Minister of Government and Justice Jose Raul Mulino

announced in late October that the GOP intended to establish four

maritime operating centers to interdict narcotics and other illegal

items transiting Panamanian waters. The operation centers would be

jointly manned by security forces from the Panamanian National

Police (PNP), National Aero-Naval Service (SENAN), and National

Frontier Service (SENAFRONT). The idea for a joint maritime task

force incorporating various Panamanian security services originated

in the U.S. Embassy's Law Enforcement and Security Working Group as

a possible solution to a FARC drug trafficking organization

operating on the Pacific Coast. When the Ambassador suggested the

idea to Mulino and Vice President/Foreign Minister Juan Carlos

Varela, both were enthusiastic. However, Mulino later muddled the

issue in a premature and incorrect announcement of joint "bases"

which implied they would be U.S.-Panamanian bases, sparking an

outcry. Mulino and the service chiefs have now taken the original

idea and expanded it to four potential locations. However, the GOP

has not yet named a commanding officer or dedicated any specific

resources to the idea, leaving us with the impression that it may

have become too diluted to achieve the desired quick results. As

we move forward, we must proceed cautiously with our support to

avoid feeding the debate currently underway about U.S. attempts to

re-militarize Panama. End summary.







Background and History



-------------------------------



2. (C) Panama's territorial waters are one of the main trafficking

routes in Central America, with recent estimates indicating that

2009 saw three times as much cocaine moving through Panama than in

2008, or more than 25% of all cocaine reaching Mexico transiting

through Panama's waters. Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)

move drugs on short hops, requiring a sophisticated network of

lookouts, refueling stations, and logistical support as loads are

moved on to land and back to water. The network is resulting in

rampant corruption and a spiraling violent crime rate. The GOP

realizes it is losing control.







3. (C) One of the reasons the problem has grown is that the former

National Maritime Service (SMN) was at best ineffective, and at

worst actively collaborated with drug traffickers, since the time

when Ricky Traad was its director (Sept 2004-March 2007). In

addition to Traad's own crimes, for which he is being tried, Traad

allowed corruption to invade most of the officer corps and the

institution in general. As a result of SMN's manifest failure to

confront drug trafficking, the Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section

(NAS) helped the PNP create its own maritime law enforcement unit,

the Unidad de Mantenamiento y Operaciones Fluvial (UMOF). This unit

has been Panama's most successful maritime law enforcement unit for

the last several years. However, the UMOF was always a stopgap

solution, and it has no real growth potential because the police

lack the ability to develop a long, successive line of boat

operators and unit Commanders. Interpreting their area of

responsibility as including the coastal waters, National Frontier

Service (SENAFRONT) also began developing a maritime capability to

help patrol the coasts of the Darien and Kuna Yala provinces and

the Darien river systems.







4. (C) As part of the security reforms instituted by former

President Martin Torrijos, SMN was combined with the National Air

Service (SAN) to form the National Aeronaval Service (SENAN) in

late 2008. Former head of SAN Rigoberto Gordon was named the first

Director of SENAN. By empowering a small group of like-minded

officers, limiting the flow of information, and exercising tight

control over the SENAN's most effective interceptor boats and



crews, Gordon and his deputy Commissioner Juan Vergara created a

limited response capability within the SENAN that had not

previously existed. After no seizures in the previous three years,

the SENAN has seized over 4 tons of cocaine in the last year, and

begun to build up its ability to effectively cooperate with U.S.

maritime interdiction vessels.







Present Situation



---------------------



5. (C) Despite these improvements, Panama has a weak maritime

counter-narcotics response capability throughout the country. Most

maritime assets are based in the Vasquez Nunez de Balboa (VNB)

Naval base in Panama City, several hours away from any likely drug

trafficking contact in the Pacific. Panama's Caribbean waters are

basically undefended. U.S. Coast Guard and Navy ships on

counter-narcotics missions patrol the waters around Panama, but to

be truly effective, these ships need Panamanian interceptor boats

to work with them. In addition, as a response to the U.S. presence

off the Darien's Pacific coast, traffickers have begun to use slow

moving "pangas" traveling very close to shore. The only way to cut

this route is by putting Panamanian assets out to patrol close to

shore and to board and search these vessels. Currently, none of

the three police forces coordinate their patrolling or maintain

tactical communication. It is vital to create a mechanism to

coordinate the actions of the three forces, especially off Darien's

Pacific coast.







Embassy Proposal



----------------------



6. (C) Based on our on-going security dialogue with the new

Panamanian administration and our united assessment of the urgency

of the trafficking problem along the Darien Pacific coast, an

Embassy team developed the idea of a 100 percent Panamanian joint

maritime task force (JTF). The original proposal suggested the JTF

would consist of the three Panamanian security forces with an

operations center in Puerto Pinas, Darien. By concentrating

Panama's resources in one strategic area, the goal was to cut off

the route through Panama's territorial waters between Colombia and

Panama City. This would have the simultaneous effect of weakening

the FARC in the Darien, which controls this route, and decreasing

gang activity that feeds off drug trafficking in the greater-Panama

City area. The project aimed to create a model JTF that could be

replicated according to the evolution of drug trafficking patterns.

The U.S. could provide logistical and training assistance through

our regular NAS and SOUTHCOM funding streams and programs. The

non-paper describing how the JTF might work was passed around

enthusiastically at the top levels of the GOP.







Controversy Arises



-----------------------



7. (C) On September 26, while President Martinelli and Vice

President/Foreign Minister Varela were in New York City meeting

with Secretary Clinton on the margins of UNGA, MOGJ Mulino made a

public appearance in Panama in which he mentioned "joint maritime

bases," "international cooperation," and "United States" in the

same sentence. At the time, the Defense Cooperation Agreement

between Colombia and the U.S. was hotly debated in Latin America,

and Mulino's off-the-cuff comments resulted immediately in press

articles and op-eds decrying U.S. plans to re-establish our

military presence in Panama. Although VP/FM Varela publicly

clarified that the "joint" in JTF meant various Panamanian security

forces, the suspicion that the U.S. seeks to establish bases here

persists in journalistic, academic, and civic society circles.

Therefore, both the Embassy and the GOP have sought to keep the

planning low-profile. Nonetheless, we continued collaborating on

the idea of a 30-man JTF housed in Puerto Pinas, which could be

stood up relatively quickly with existing resources once the

commanding officer and personnel were designated by the GOP.







Cooperation Agreement Between PNP, SENAN and SENAFRONT



--------------------------------------------- ----------------------

--------------



8. (C) The Embassy continued encouraging MOGJ Mulino to work on a

document that would establish the Puerto Pinas JTF, and on October

26 he announced to the press that the PNP, SENAFRONT, and SENAN had

signed a cooperation agreement, which would allow the GOP to

establish four joint aero-maritime operations centers to combat

drug trafficking, arms trafficking, alien smuggling, and

trafficking in persons in Panamanian waters and along coastlines.

The four sites included:



--Puerto Pinas in Darien;



--Punto Coco, on the Pearl Islands (previously identified by the

USG as a good forward operations site);



--Chapera, another of the Pearl Islands, which is embroiled in

ownership controversy and which the USG therefore could not

support, and whose proximity to Punto Coco calls its strategic

value into question; and



--Rambala, in Chiriqui Grande on the Caribbean coast, where a

previous agreement with a private oil company already allows the

GOP use of a dock and other facilities.







9. (U) Mulino's announcement resulted in another press round of

anti-GOP and anti-U.S. articles. During a November 2 All Saints'

Day commemorative event hosted by the president of Panama City's

municipal council, keynote speaker Julio Yao, a foreign affairs

professor at the University of Panama, lambasted the GOP for its

intentions to install "bases" with U.S. support and violate

Panama's sovereignty. VP/FM Varela interrupted his speech to

demand that he show some respect to President Martinelli and not

distort the true intent of the government's plan.







Comment: Going Forward



--------------------------------



10. (C) The agreement among the security forces, while a step

forward, does not bring the GOP much closer to getting the JTF at

Puerto Pinas up and running. Mulino must still designate a

commanding officer and ensure forces are seconded to the unit. The

public controversy is not the only hurdle to overcome, as it now

appears that support for the idea, and for Mulino himself, may be

waning in the GOP. VP/FM Varela told the Ambassador October 23

that the GOP planned to split the existing MOGJ into two

ministries, one handling security issues and the other government

services such as the post offices; Mulino would get the less

glamorous portfolio. Minister of the Presidency Jimmy Papadimitriu

told press at an independence day event on November 3 that he did

not agree with Mulino's "patchwork approach" to security, adding,

"Neither bases, nor police, nor prisons will solve the security

problem....I don't know if the government shares my view, but it is



my personal opinion." He also said that a group specialized in

security issues was evaluating the situation, probably referring to

the Israeli firm Global CST (septel).







11. (C) The Embassy still fully supports implementation of the JTF

model in Puerto Pinas, and is standing by to help with training and

logistical support, including construction of a dock, operations

center, and barracks if necessary. However, the USG must approach

the issue with care, making sure it is seen as a Panamanian

initiative and has full Panamanian ownership, and does not become a

lightning rod for further accusations that the U.S. has military

intentions toward Panama.

STEPHENSON


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101 años de Panamá América

 
101 años Panamá América