Reporte de Panamá sobre actividades de Chávez

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PANAMA 000835



SIPDIS



DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/AND WHA/CEN

WHA A/S ROGER NOREIGA

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2015

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PM, VZ, LABOR, HUMAN RIGHTS,POLMIL

SUBJECT: PANAMA'S REPORT ON CHAVEZ'S ACTIVITIES



REF: A. STATE 43965

B. PANAMA 00234

C. PANAMA 00810

D. 04 PANAMA 03025

E. PANAMA 00255

F. PANAMA 00235

G. PANAMA 00799

H. 04 PANAMA 2452

I. 04 PANAMA 2937

J. DAO PANAMA IRR 6 882 9925 04

K. DAO PANAMA IRR 6 882 0113 05



Classified By: AMB Linda Watt. Reason E.O. 12958 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (SBU) Per reftel A, following is Embassy's report on

Chavez's activities in Panama, making reference to its

extensive prior reporting in reftel B. Embassy has already

forwarded the desk copies of recent DAO Panama reports (and

Embassy political and economic reftels) on Chavez and

Venezuela.



Summary

-------

2. (S) The GOV's alleged ties to radical groups in Panama

encompass financial and/or technical support for student

groups, Social Security (CSS) reform opponents, and

Venezuelan-inspired Bolivarian Circles. Panamanian press and

opinion leaders view Chavez as a hot-headed populist with

more potential to destabilize Colombia than Panama. While

some high-ranking GOP officials are less sanguine, President

Martin Torrijos's desire to pursue a commercially attractive

oil pipeline deal with Venezuela demonstrates a belief that

Panama will be able to utilize Venezuelan investment to

improve its economic outlook while keeping unwanted

ideological and political manipulation at arm's length.

Panama's law enforcement ties with Venezuela, much like its

visa policies, do not differ markedly from its policies with

its other neighbors. Embassy believes that Chavez has little

support in Panama at this moment, but a prolonged crisis

perhaps sparked by civil disorders attending

soon-to-be-announced CSS reform could provide the Bolivarian

Circles (in alliance with small but well-trained Panamanian

leftist groups) with an opening to cause problems for the

Torrijos government. End Summary.



GOV's Activities and Ties to Radicals

-------------------------------------

3. (C) Most information regarding the GOV's activities and

ties to radical groups in Panama is relatively recent and

revolves around a December 2004 report about 10 "Bolivarian

Circles" that appeared in a major Panamanian daily (reftel

B), although such Circles apparently have existed since 2000.

Circle spokesman Fernan Casis claimed that the Circles

attend functions at the Venezuelan and Cuban Embassies but do

not receive funds from the GOV or GOP. Casis also claimed

that adherents include labor and student leaders and PRD and

former People's Party (Panama's defunct Moscow-oriented

communist party) members. He also asserted and that the

Circles are on good terms with (the presumably radical

elements) within the SUNTRACS, CONUSI, and CONATO labor

groups (reftel C). In February, Bolivarian Circle leaders,

including university professor Carlos Wong Broce, held a

meeting in Cocle province to agitate for the formation of

another Circle.



4. (C) Other unconfirmed rumors link Circle or Chavez

financing to the opposition movement protesting the

government's upcoming CSS reform, including SUNTRACS and

former CSS Director Juan Jovane. In August 2004, PolOff

observed pro-Chavista banners at the offices of CONATO member

National Center for Panamanian Workers (CGTP) during a

routine courtesy call.



Mainstream Media Sees Chavez Through the AP

-------------------------------------------

5. (SBU) Despite recent chatter about Bolivarian circles,

mainstream Panamanian media generally view Chavez much as the

major wire services (such as AP and Reuters) do, as a

hot-headed populist who could destabilize Panama's neighbor,

Colombia, more than Panama. Chavez consistently is a

lukewarm story and most press follow-up on Bolivarian Circles

appears in gossip columns. A rare editorial on Chavez in

March reflecting a common Panamanian perspective rejected

Bolivarian Circles and Chavism, emphasizing Panama's proud

and "sovereign" history as the author of its own destiny - it

won the Panama Canal from the United States.



Academic Community Sees Marginal Influence

------------------------------------------

6. (C) Academic elites and opinion leaders within Panama

echo the mainstream media and generally see Chavez as an

unstable blowhard with marginal influence. University of

Panama Professor and human rights expert Miguel Antonio

Bernal claimed that most of the UP's 75,000 students and

faculty view Chavez as an extremist. The exceptions are

three radical student groups with fewer than 100 members

apiece: University Popular Block (BPU), Transforming Action

Thought (PAT), and Revolutionary Student Front (FER). Bernal

also claimed that one employees' association with fewer than

300 members, Association of University of Panama Employees

(ASEUPA), sympathizes with Chavez. Bernal suspects that the

student groups began receiving Venezuelan money about six

months ago because group members suddenly seemed richer about

that time.



Lawmakers Downplay Bolivarian Potential

---------------------------------------

While Ministers Express Concern

-------------------------------

7. (C) Several prominent Panamanian legislators denied that

Bolivarian Circles could harm or make any difference in

Panama (reftel B). While the media and opinion makers have

paid little attention to Chavez, top policy makers, including

Minister of the Presidency Ubaldino Real, have expressed

concern for Chavez-supported activities and their potential

impact on CSS protests (reftel B).



Torrijos Defends Recent Economic Ties

-------------------------------------

8. (C) Panama's economic ties to Venezuela consist almost

entirely of oil sales. (see reftels B, D, E). Recently,

Panama joined the G-4 (which includes Venezuela, Colombia and

Mexico)(see reftel D). Panama imports around 80% of its oil

from Venezuela and recently began discussions about using a

part-U.S.-owned oil pipeline in western Panama to send

Venezuelan crude oil to a Pacific port for Asian (read

Chinese) customers (reftel E).



10. (S) Torrijos and GOP officials repeatedly have told

Emboffs that Panama's interest in a pipeline deal is a purely

commercial arrangement that would exploit Panama's geographic

location (reftel F). In April, Torrijos reportedly told U.S.

Congressman Rick Renzi that he was interested in the pipeline

project because it would produce much-needed cash for Panama

(reftel G). Further, Torrijos rationalized that Panama would

be able to control the flow of oil and that Colombia would be

willing to build an oil pipeline if the Panama deal falls

through.



11. (C) Panamanian MFA officials deny that the limited

commercial links, part of Panama's broader regional strategy,

increase Venezuelan leverage over Panama (reftels B, H, I).



Limited Law Enforcement Cooperation

-----------------------------------

12. (C) While dozens of PPF officers have been trained in

Venezuela over recent years, the U.S. and other Latin

American countries (such as Argentina and Chile) have

historically exercised greater influence within Panama's

security forces (reftel B). Of the 45 ranking PPF officers

sent on international courses in 2004, only five studied in

Venezuela. Embassy is unaware of any information-sharing

agreement between Panama and Venezuela. PPF officers

recently trained in Venezuela express the same disdain of

other Panamanians for Chavez and his Circles (reftel B).



13. (C) Chavez has little influence in Panama, despite his

living 18 months here following his failed 1992 coup (reftel

B). Chavez, at that time, allegedly stayed with his former

military school roommate, current Panamanian secret service

(SPI) Deputy Director Juan Antonio Gomez, but some sources

report that the pair have had a falling out (reftels J, K).





No Special Visa Requirements

----------------------------

14. (SBU) Panama's visa requirements for Venezuelan

passport holders are identical to those for U.S. citizens.

Visitors for stays up to 90 days need a visa, but can enter

with a tourist card for stays of 30 days. Panama does not

place special requirements on Venezuelans for permanent

residency.



Comment

-------

15. (C) While Chavista propaganda could capitalize on

Panamanian discontent with corruption and social inequality,

Panamanians, proud of their "sovereign" history in which they

achieved independence from Colombia and won the Canal from

the U.S., are put off by the Chavista ideology. Bolivarian

Circles have named themselves after Panamanian national

heroes in the fight for sovereignty, including President

Torrijos's deceased father, General Omar Torrijos, although

this transparent ploy has not translated into increased

popular support.



16. (S) Today's small, inconsequential Bolivarian Circles

could gain political influence in the event of a prolonged,

general political crisis in Panama that undermined the

legitimacy of the political system. More immediately, some

in the Torrijos administration are concerned that Venezuelan

money might fund home-grown Panamanian leftist groups to

organize violent street demonstrations against

soon-to-be-announced CSS reforms. President Torrijos, with a

better claim to the legacy of Panamanian sovereignty than the

Circles, not surprisingly is more preoccupied with improving

Panama's economic situation through regional commercial ties

than with the populist/socialist Bolivarian ideology. So

far, Torrijos has not succumbed to the temptations of

subsidized Venezuelan oil, although we have heard unconfirmed

reports that Venezuela has offered Panama lower-priced oil in

return for diplomatic support for Cuba in the United Nations.

Torrijos's April 7 announcement of a temporary cut in gas

taxes demonstrates his preoccupation with the political

implications of galloping fuel prices. While GOP officials

discount any enduring convergence of Panamanian and

Venezuelan political, military, or ideological interests, how

Venezuelan "oil diplomacy" may play out in the long term is

unclear.



WATT