Oscar Naranjo rinde explicaciones a EE.UU

ID DOC: 240225FECHA: 0000-00-00 00:00:00FUENTE: Embassy BogotaPRIVACIDAD: SECRET//NOFORNREFERENCIA: VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHBO #3559/01 3502021 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 162021Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1639 INFO RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC S E C R E T BOGOTA 003559 NOFORN SIPDIS E.

O.

12958: DECL: 2019/12/16 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, SNAR, PINR, ASEC, PM, CO SUBJECT: Charge Discusses Colombia-Panama Border Cooperation with Police Chief REF: PANAMA 877 CLASSIFIED BY: Brian A.

Nichols, Charge' d'Affaires; REASON: 1.

4(B), (D) Summary ------- 1.

(S/NF) Charge d'Affaires met with General Oscar Naranjo, Director of the Colombian National Police (CNP), on December 15 to discuss Colombia - Panama law enforcement cooperation.

Naranjo repeatedly stressed that cooperation with Panama would be completely coordinated with the USG, and that the CNP would pull back if the USG was ever uncomfortable.

He was relieved to hear that the USG welcomed GOC-GOP law enforcement cooperation, provided it was coordinated with USG activities.

Naranjo said that the following lines of cooperation were discussed during his December 9 meeting with Panamanian President Martinelli: coordinated border patrols; GOC participation in a GOP intelligence and operational facility; intelligence sharing to capture Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) leaders; lessons learned from combating urban crime in Colombia; and sharing the CNP's criminal database with the GOP.

Naranjo assured the Charge that the GOC has never discussed bombing FARC camps in Panama with Martinelli's government.

Naranjo warned Martinelli of Venezuelan involvement in drug trafficking and support for the FARC.

End Summary.

2.

(C) Charge d'Affaires met with General Oscar Naranjo, Director of the Colombian National Police (CNP), and Colonel Jose Luis Vargas, CNP Intelligence (DIPOL) Chief, on December 15 to discuss Colombia - Panama law enforcement cooperation, particularly along the border.

DEA Regional Director, ORA Chief, and Deputy Political Counselor (notetaker) also attended.

Law Enforcement & Intel Cooperation ----------------------------------- 3.

(S) Naranjo explained that during a conversation between President Alvaro Uribe and Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli, Martinelli invited Naranjo to visit Panama to discuss law enforcement cooperation in the border area.

Naranjo noted that during the Ibero-American Summit in Portugal at the end of November, Colombian Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez and Vice President / Foreign Minister Juan Carlos Varela had agreed to negotiate a framework document for law enforcement cooperation, under the existing bilateral police agreement.

Naranjo and Vargas traveled to Panama December 9, and met with Martinelli, Varela, Secretary General of the Council of Public Security and National Defense Olmedo Alfaro, National Police Director Gustavo Perez, National Border Service (SENAFRON) Director Frank Abrego, and others.

Naranjo noted that Martinelli's presidency provided a great opportunity for improved bilateral collaboration compared with Torrijos' presidency.

4.

(S/NF/rel Panama) During the December 9 meeting, the following lines of cooperation were discussed: -- Coordinated patrols along the border: patrols could be simply notified to the other country, in parallel on their respective sides of the border, or with combined units.

The GOC would be comfortable with whatever the GOP wanted; -- Colombia participating in a GOP intelligence analysis and operational command facility on Pino Island (which has a GOP landing strip); -- Martinelli's request for intelligence sharing to capture Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 57th Front leaders (specifically alias "Silver," alias "el Becerro," and alias "Nader").

GOC agreed and had already sent 26 CNP to Panama on December 2 to administer polygraphs, expand intelligence sharing, and help verify the location of FARC camps to determine possible operational targets; -- Martinelli told Naranjo that urban crime was booming in Panama, and was a bigger problem than the FARC.

He asked for information on lessons learned from the GOC's Citizen Security program; and -- Naranjo offered to share the CNP's criminal database with the GOP so that the GOP can know if Colombians entering or found in Panama have criminal records.

Naranjo expects this database sharing to be online within a month.

Warnings re.

Corruption and Venezuela ------------------------------------- 5.

(S/NF) Naranjo said he warned Martinelli that increased cooperation could lead him to identify corruption within the GOP, and Martinelli accepted that.

Naranjo also cautioned that Venezuela plays an increasing role in the drug trade and counternarcotics cooperation might well bring Panama into frictions with the BRV.

Naranjo cited Amilcar Figueroa as an example.

Martinelli had the same impression regarding BRV ties to narcotrafficking and Venezuela's threat to Panama.

He said Panamanian authorities might have been able to act against Figueroa if the Colombian government had advised the Panamanian government sooner of Figueroa's activities and the arrest warrant against him in Colombia (Naranjo told us he doubted Martinelli would have been able to pull anything off).

Naranjo agreed to share the GOC's information on Venezuelan ties to the FARC.

No Plans for Bombings in Panama ------------------------------- 6.

(S/NF) In response to Charge's questions on operations against the FARC, Naranjo and Vargas said that bombings have never been discussed with the Panamanians.

There is no identified target location yet, and the GOC would defer to the GOP's preference as to whether any operation would involve solely Panamanian forces (perhaps those trained in Colombia's Junglas Special Forces school), GOC advice, or joint forces.

This decision has not yet been made; only target individuals have been identified.

Naranjo added that a bombing operation would likely have politically problematic ramifications.

Coordinated activities along the lines above would be far more useful.

GOC Will Not Proceed Without USG Blessing ----------------------------------------- 7.

(S) Naranjo repeatedly stressed that Colombian cooperation with Panama would be completely transparent and coordinated with the USG.

The GOC would not take any action with Panama that would interfere with USG operations in Panama or make the USG uncomfortable.

If the USG did not completely accept the CNP working with Panama, Naranjo would not do so -- the relationship with the USG was too important.

8.

(S/NF) Though it was a Colombian/Panamanian decision, the Charge welcomed Colombian - Panamanian security cooperation, as long as activities were fully coordinated with USG operations in the area.

He said the information Naranjo had just provided would ease any concerns.

DEA Regional Director and ORA Chief also stressed that direct Colombian - Panamanian police cooperation was welcome and that their agencies in Colombia and Panama were coordinating.

Naranjo was visibly relieved.

9.

(S/NF) The CNP Commander said he had not heard from the GOP since the GOP's December 10 meeting with Ambassador Stephenson (reftel).

During their December 9 meeting, Naranjo urged Martinelli to inform the U.

S.

Embassy in Panama, as he regularly does the U.

S.

Embassy in Bogota.

Naranjo said that during the meeting, Alfaro stated that Colombia - Panama cooperation should be autonomous, with no need to involve the USG.

However, Naranjo said he replied that the USG was Colombia's key partner, and must be kept informed (especially on any efforts involving high value targets).

Martinelli instructed Varela to inform the U.

S.

Embassy in Panama.

NICHOLS